| Main |
1.1. |
According to IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20, Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime [1], the objective of a State’s nuclear security regime is to protect persons, property, society and the environment from harmful consequences of a nuclear security event. Responsibility rests with the State for meeting this objective by establishing, implementing, maintaining and sustaining a nuclear security regime applicable to nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities and associated activities under a State’s jurisdiction. |
| Main |
1.2. |
Such a regime can be strengthened through appropriate training and education at all levels, and in all organizations and facilities involved in nuclear security, by preparing the next generation of professionals with knowledge, expertise and understanding of the importance of nuclear security. |
| Main |
1.3. |
This publication is intended to assist States in developing a model academic curriculum for nuclear security. It is complementary to, and consistent with, the following Nuclear Security Recommendations publications: (a) IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/Revision 5) [2]; (b) IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities [3]; (c) IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control [4]. |
| Main |
1.4. |
This publication updates and supersedes IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 12, Educational Programme in Nuclear Security, which was issued in 2010. Since that time, the body of knowledge in the field of nuclear security has grown substantially, and the IAEA Nuclear Security Series has expanded to cover more topics. The first revision of this publication takes into account the IAEA Nuclear Security Series guidance published between 2010 and 2018, as well as the feedback from the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) community and other international experts. |
| Main |
1.5. |
This publication is intended to provide a model academic curriculum covering the entire spectrum of nuclear security topics for a master’s degree programme or for an academic certificate programme in nuclear security. The publication can be used by university curriculum developers as well as faculty and instructors from academic and other educational institutions that are implementing or considering educational programmes in nuclear security. It might also be of value to other stakeholders in nuclear security, such as decision makers, operators, regulators, law enforcement agencies and other entities responsible for nuclear security. It may also be useful to prospective students as an informational resource. |
| Main |
1.6. |
This model academic curriculum in nuclear security can also be used as a resource to facilitate the development by national authorities of a comprehensive national nuclear security human resource development programme, which has the purpose of developing and maintaining relevant knowledge and skills and sustaining personnel qualified to deal with current and future nuclear security challenges.
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| Main |
1.7. |
This publication offers a substantive and structural framework for a comprehensive master’s degree programme or academic certificate programme in nuclear security. It is not the intent of this publication to be a substitute for a comprehensive professional training programme in nuclear security. |
| Main |
1.8. |
This curriculum outlines modules that are directly related to nuclear security. It is assumed that students entering a nuclear security graduate programme have prior knowledge and understanding of scientific concepts and principles necessary to successfully complete all academic requirements towards a graduate degree. |
| Main |
1.9. |
All areas of nuclear security as laid out in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications are covered by this publication in terms of their contribution to this academic programme, including physical protection of nuclear material and associated facilities, security of other radioactive material and associated facilities and activities, detection of material out of regulatory control and response to nuclear security events, among other more specific topics. |
| Main |
1.10. |
Section 2 describes the structure and possible implementation of the proposed curriculum and provides an overview of the recommended master’s degree programme. Section 3 offers an overview to the academic certificate programme. Annex I provides a brief description of each module, relevant learning objectives, and an outline of individual modules. Annex II provides an overview of a notional curriculum for a certificate programme in nuclear security. |
| Main |
2.1. |
Given the multidisciplinary nature of the field of nuclear security, the number of universities implementing the degree programme in full as outlined in this publication may be small. The academic curriculum presented in this publication is therefore a model that seeks to describe accurately and exhaustively the existing body of knowledge in the field of nuclear security at the time of its publication. Institutions and faculties wishing to establish such academic programmes may choose to use this publication in the following ways: To establish a comprehensive master’s degree programme in nuclear security that encompasses all aspects of the discipline;
To establish or enhance an existing master’s degree programme in a related discipline with emphasis on nuclear security as a whole or in part;
To offer a specialized diploma or certificate in nuclear security as part of an existing academic programme;
To offer a course or module on nuclear security to enhance an existing curriculum.
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| Main |
2.2. |
The following sections outline a model curriculum structure for such a degree programme, notional paths towards a master’s degree in a specialized field, methodology, programme learning objectives, and finally, some issues for universities to consider when implementing such a programme. |
| Main |
2.3. |
The model curriculum is divided into four parts: prerequisite knowledge; a standalone module NS0. Introduction to Nuclear Security; core modules; and elective modules. Each of these parts is discussed in the following sections. |
| Prerequisite knowledge |
2.4. |
Students participating in a full Master of Science in Nuclear Security can be expected to have prior demonstrable knowledge in the following areas: NSPR1. Ionizing Radiation, Safety and Radiation Protection;
NSPR2. Methods and Instruments for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Measurements;
NSPR3. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Applications;
NSPR4. Methods of Scientific Research.
|
| Prerequisite knowledge |
2.5. |
Universities might include these modules as part of the proposed degree programme in nuclear security, and might request that incoming students demonstrate relevant competence through previous course work or professional experience, or both. |
| Standalone module: NS0. Introduction to Nuclear Security |
2.6. |
This module is designed as an overview of the entire field of nuclear security, presented in a single module that would be suitable for inclusion as an introduction to the field of nuclear security as part of a related academic or degree programme. One example of the use of this module is to provide students who are in the process of completing a Master of Science in Nuclear Engineering or a Master in International Relations with a comprehensive overview of nuclear security in a single module. Depending on the nature of the existing academic programme, instructors may wish to emphasize some parts of this module while covering others briefly. |
| Standalone module: NS0. Introduction to Nuclear Security |
2.7. |
This module is not intended to be part of a comprehensive master’s degree programme as described in the rest of this publication because it provides the same information in a condensed format and would therefore be redundant. |
| Core Modules |
2.8. |
Students participating in a full programme for a Master of Science in Nuclear Security according to the model curriculum described in this publication would be expected to take the following core modules: NSC1. International and National Legal, Regulatory and Institutional Framework for Nuclear Security;
NSC2. Risk Informed Approach to Nuclear Security;
NSC3. Coordination and Cooperation of Stakeholders at the National and International Level;
NSC4. Nuclear Security Management at the Facility Level;
NSC5. Security of Sensitive Nuclear Information;
NSC6. Nuclear Security Culture;
NSC7. Threat Assessment;
NSC8. Physical Protection Systems Design and Evaluation;
NSC9. Physical Protection Technologies and Equipment;
NSC10. Use of Nuclear Material Accounting and Control (NMAC) for Nuclear Security;
NSC11. Preventing and Protecting Against Insider Threat;
NSC12. Security of Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material in Transport;
NSC13. Computer Security for a Nuclear World;
NSC14. Detection of Criminal or Other Unauthorized Acts involving Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control;
NSC15. Response to Criminal or Other Unauthorized Acts Involving Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control.
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| Elective Modules |
2.9. |
Elective modules are designed to supplement the core modules described above with specialized knowledge in various areas of nuclear security. The selection of elective modules by the student or the institution may depend on the student’s choice to specialize in a particular area of nuclear security or on the design of the academic programme by the institution. This list of elective modules could be supplemented by the university or instructor to include other modules relevant to the degree programme. These elective modules include: NSE1. Interfaces of Nuclear Security with Safety and Safeguards;
NSE2. Legal Drafting for Nuclear Security;
NSE3. International Cooperation on Nuclear Security;
NSE4. Developing and Implementing Design Basis Threat (DBT);
NSE5. Vulnerability Assessment of Physical Protection Systems;
NSE6. Nuclear Security Culture Self‑Assessment and Enhancement;
NSE7. Designing Physical Protection Systems for Nuclear and Radiological Facilities;
NSE8. Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Nuclear Power Plants and Research Reactors;
NSE9. Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for Facilities that Process Nuclear Material;
NSE10. Establishing and Implementing a Transport Security Plan;
NSE11. Designing and Implementing a National Detection Architecture (NDA);
NSE12. Import/Export and Transit Control Mechanism and Regime;
NSE13. Nuclear Security Framework for Major Public Events;
NSE14. Radiological Crime Scene Management;
NSE15. Nuclear Forensics Analysis;
NSE16. Information and Computer Security Incident Response;
NSE17. Conducting Computer Security Assessments.
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| Elective Modules |
2.10. |
Table 1 outlines the approximate percentage distribution of various types of learning module cluster within a degree programme. These percentages have also been aligned with two common types of academic credit calculation system found in different parts of the world: the North American credit hour system and the European Credit Transfer and Accumulation System (ECTS). For convenience, a column with estimated student work hours spent on each component of the programme is also provided. The information in the table is not prescriptive; instead it is only meant to provide approximate values of dedicated workload and can be interpreted by universities designing their degree programmes according to their actual need. |
| Elective Modules |
2.11. |
Figure 1 represents an outline of the structure of the proposed master’s degree programme curriculum.
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| Elective Modules |
2.12. |
This section introduces a set of notional paths towards a master’s degree, which could incorporate a specialization in nuclear security into one of several commonly found academic programmes offered by universities worldwide. |
| Elective Modules |
2.13. |
Given the diversity of educational systems around the world and of the mechanisms used to evaluate and analyse such demand, it would be impossible for this publication to offer an exact formula that universities might follow to design and implement a successful and, more importantly, sustainable degree programme in nuclear security. One of the biggest challenges that universities need to overcome on their path towards establishing a new degree programme is to verify that job market analysis demonstrates that there is long term demand for graduates with the degree in the proposed discipline. Procedures for evaluating, establishing and analysing the need, and then designing and implementing a new degree programme to address it may be too prolonged and cumbersome for many universities to undertake. Even if a university were to succeed in this first step, the proposed curriculum should be approved and then periodically accredited by a government authority or a professional accreditation body, which frequently results in the timeline of establishing such new degree programmes spanning 5–10 years. |
| Elective Modules |
2.14. |
In addition, nuclear security is a multidisciplinary field of study. Development of a comprehensive master’s degree programme in this field would therefore necessitate the input and participation of the faculty and experts from a multitude of disciplines, faculties, departments and sometimes even outside institutions. For these reasons, many institutions choose instead the much more flexible path of incorporating the topic of nuclear security, in some format, into existing degree programmes at the institution that are relevant to nuclear security. Moreover, a programme drawing on the existing degree framework available in the university and tailored to a specific target group of potential students is likely to be more sustainable. |
| Elective Modules |
2.15. |
There exist a range of possible broad areas of expertise and ultimate career paths for students that university officials and faculty members may wish to take into consideration when making decisions about establishing nuclear security specific degree programmes within their academic curricula. A clear awareness of these areas of expertise and ultimate career paths may: Enable university faculty, curriculum developers and administrators to design a programme that best fits the university’s existing programmes;
Be used in promotional materials developed by these universities to attract students into the programme;
Be used by prospective students in making informed decisions about pursuing a career in nuclear security, especially broadening the scope of such a choice for them in situations where nuclear security is frequently assumed to be an exclusively technical field of study.
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| Elective Modules |
2.16. |
Figure 2 provides a graphical representation of a range of potential areas of expertise and ultimate career paths relevant to nuclear security. |
| Elective Modules |
2.17. |
Table 2 provides a cross‑reference of these areas of expertise with relevant core and elective modules as well as potential thesis projects. This table could be used as a tool by university faculty and curriculum developers in designing a programme that merges the existing degree programme with both the core and elective modules of the proposed model curriculum. |
| Elective Modules |
2.18. |
In the majority of universities, students have to be physically present at the universities for lectures, practical exercises and examinations in order to complete graduate degree programmes. There are several factors that make a degree programme in nuclear security a special case, in which the students might not need to be physically present to complete the programme: The complexity and the multidisciplinary nature of the field of nuclear security, which may necessitate coordination with other departments or instructors;
The availability of technical experts, who might be invited from outside, and who might not be able to accommodate the traditional academic calendar, resulting in the need to offer course content in short 1–2 week long modules;
The fact that most potential students into the master’s degree programme in nuclear security might come from the nuclear profession, and are likely already engaged in a full time career in their field;
The availability of degree programmes in nuclear security locally or even regionally might be fairly low, creating a need for students and employers to look for educational opportunities globally.
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| Elective Modules |
2.19. |
These challenges are not unique to nuclear security education. To address them in similar situations, many universities offer graduate degree programmes to early and mid‑career professionals that accommodate their limitations with respect to time available and the ability to be physically present at the university. Such programmes fully utilize innovations in computer and information technologies, virtual reality, videoconferencing, social media and other methods of delivering and exchanging information. Some universities also offer blended learning options, which include various types of long distance learning, short term visits to the main campus for examinations and practical or laboratory work, various consortia and other arrangements among universities to offer joint degrees and provide recognition of credits and other options. Universities that plan to develop and offer nuclear security education programmes might wish to consider all of these proven and sustainable possibilities for establishing their programmes. |
| Elective Modules |
2.20. |
Upon completion of a master’s degree programme in nuclear security, graduates should be expected to have at least the following professional attributes: Conceptual understanding of a national nuclear security regime, its objectives, components, systems and their various interactions, as well as the measures necessary to establish and sustain a nuclear security regime;
Knowledge and understanding of the principles, assumptions, tools and equipment for protecting nuclear material as well as other radioactive material, associated facilities, computers and networks, activities and related information;
Awareness and appreciation of the threats posed by nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control as well as knowledge of the tools necessary to address these threats at the national level;
Recognition of the importance of human factors in nuclear security, including nuclear security culture and the insider threat;
Awareness and comprehension of the international legal framework related to nuclear security, as well as relevant national laws, regulations and procedures;
Ability to creatively apply the above concepts, attributes and scientific methods to find and implement solutions to nuclear security challenges.
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| Elective Modules |
2.21. |
Universities planning to establish educational programmes in nuclear security might need to address two important challenges in addition to that of curriculum development. The first challenge is the availability of qualified instructors to provide instruction on most, if not all, areas of nuclear security. This issue can be addressed through the various options outlined above for different teaching methodology approaches. In addition, the sharing of experience, resources and good practices in nuclear security education among States is valuable, as are faculty development courses offered by more experienced institutions and academics. |
| Elective Modules |
2.22. |
The second challenge is the availability of well equipped laboratories to be used in educational settings. Most suitable for this task would be laboratories already available in the departments of nuclear physics or engineering. However, few of them have the specialized equipment and tools that a comprehensive educational programme in nuclear security might demand. One of the options that could help universities to address this challenge could be to partner with a national or regional nuclear security support centre, if available. In some cases, these centres possess a comprehensive inventory of equipment for training needs. |
| Elective Modules |
3.1. |
An academic certificate in nuclear security is distinct from a training course in that it is not aimed at teaching the participants a particular skill or at conveying knowledge and skills needed to perform a specific job function. Rather, such a programme may be an option for universities and other educational institutions to offer specialized knowledge in this field to students currently enrolled in a degree programme, or to adult learners as a graduate certificate or diploma additional to their existing academic credentials. |
| Elective Modules |
3.2. |
It is also important, in this context, to differentiate between an academic certificate (proposed here) and professional certification. In the former, students are provided with a body of knowledge in a field that is generally relevant to their main area of study in order to enhance their overall knowledge of and qualifications in a specialized subject. The latter, on the other hand, offers a professional certification that is recognized by a government or a professional accreditation or certification organization, and may be necessary for the recipient to perform professional services in that field. An example of such certification would be a licence to handle radioactive, explosive, toxic or other hazardous materials. Such certification is tied to the knowledge, skills and experience expected of a professional in the field in question, as well as to job tasks assigned to such a professional. |
| Elective Modules |
3.3. |
This publication offers a model outline of an academic certificate in nuclear security, which a university may use in order to enhance the range of educational services that it offers to students. Fully recognizing that many universities and educational systems treat such programmes differently, and may assign different value to the final certificate, a standard name for this programme, the duration or number of academic hours necessary for its completion and other requirements that universities may wish to impose on the students are not specified. Rather, an outline of a notional academic certificate programme in nuclear security, including the body of knowledge that would be most appropriate for inclusion in a certificate programme curriculum, is summarized in Annex II. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Objective and Essential Elements of a State’s Nuclear Security Regime, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 20, IAEA, Vienna (2013). INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities (INFCIRC/225/ Revision 5), IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 13, IAEA, Vienna (2011). INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Radioactive Material and Associated Facilities, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (2011). EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL POLICE ORGANIZATION–INTERPOL, UNITED NATIONS INTERREGIONAL CRIME AND JUSTICE RESEARCH INSTITUTE, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANIZATION, Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 15, IAEA, Vienna (2011). INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Engineering Education: A Competence Based Approach to Curricula Development, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG‑T‑6.4, IAEA, Vienna (2014). INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Status and Trends in Nuclear Education, IAEA Nuclear Energy Series No. NG‑T‑6.1, IAEA, Vienna (2011).
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| Elective Modules |
I–1. |
This annex provides a brief description and outline of each module, as well as the relevant learning objectives of individual modules for a master of science academic curriculum in nuclear security. Where appropriate, practical and/or laboratory exercises are listed and reference publications are proposed. The references are not exhaustive, since they are for the most part limited to relevant international legal instruments (conventions, treaties, resolutions of the United Nations Security Council), IAEA Nuclear Security Series publications, and similar publications and resources. This allows university curriculum developers from different countries to recommend any other national or international publications considered relevant to course topics. |
| Elective Modules |
I–2. |
To have a full awareness of the importance, scope, principles, design and implementation of nuclear security measures at various levels, to apply scientific methods in the course of the master’s degree programme, and ultimately to succeed in this programme, prospective students need to have a prior basic understanding of radiation, the nuclear fuel cycle, radiation detection and measurement, and scientific research methodology. The purpose of this section is to point to the importance and outline the tentative scope of this prerequisite knowledge. This prerequisite knowledge is represented in proposed modules listed in this annex. These modules provide an introduction to the concepts and principles of ionizing radiation, nuclear safety and radiation protection, methods and instruments for nuclear material measurement, basics of nuclear energy, fuel cycle, and applications, as well as methods of scientific research. |
| Elective Modules |
I–3. |
While these modules are very important to the overall context of the master’s degree programme in nuclear security, their content covers issues broader than the field of nuclear security, and they are therefore specifically excluded from the proposed model curriculum. Another reason for this exclusion is the fact that many universities have only limited time and number of academic modules that they are able to include into a comprehensive master’s degree programme. They rely instead on the prospective students’ prior academic work in an undergraduate programme, which provides them with the basic scientific knowledge necessary to succeed in a specialized graduate field of study. |
| Elective Modules |
I–4. |
It is assumed that a university would ultimately make a decision about the format, scope and level at which this prior knowledge has to be demonstrated by the applicant, as well as whether to offer these modules as part of the planned master’s degree curriculum or request their completion beforehand. Consequently, no outline for these modules is provided as it is assumed that their content (either offered or requested) will be determined by the university. |
| Elective Modules |
I–5. |
Proposed prerequisite modules include: NSPR1. Ionizing Radiation, Safety and Radiation Protection;
NSPR2. Methods and Instruments for Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material Measurements;
NSPR3. Nuclear Energy, Nuclear Fuel Cycle and Nuclear Applications;
NSPR4. Methods of Scientific Research.
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| Elective Modules |
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NS0. INTRODUCTION TO NUCLEAR SECURITY To describe nuclear security main concepts and approaches, using appropriate terminology;
To discuss interrelationships of nuclear security with safety and safeguards;
To list the essential elements of a State’s nuclear security regime;
To demonstrate the importance of nuclear security.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC1. INTERNATIONAL AND NATIONAL LEGAL, REGULATORY AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR SECURITYTo demonstrate understanding of the State responsibility for nuclear security as the basic principle;
To demonstrate the knowledge of the international legal binding and non‑binding instruments relating to nuclear security;
To know the principal international and national organizations and other entities engaged in nuclear security, and the role they play;
To know the scope of international guidance and recommendations relating to nuclear security;
To demonstrate the understanding of the national regulatory infrastructure relating to nuclear security.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC2. RISK INFORMED APPROACH TO NUCLEAR SECURITYTo describe the evolution of the understanding of threat and risk;
To differentiate between threat and risk;
To identify possible threat scenarios and targets at the facility and State level;
To identify the attributes of possible adversaries;
To describe the process and methodologies, to analyse and to perform threat and risk assessment (depending on the scope of the module chosen by instructor).
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC3. COORDINATION AND COOPERATION OF STAKEHOLDERS AT THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVELTo identify various national and international stakeholders in nuclear security and describe their role in nuclear security;
To demonstrate skills in establishing and maintaining cooperative relationships among the stakeholders at the national and international level;
To describe the importance of international cooperation and national commitment in promoting effective nuclear security.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC4. NUCLEAR SECURITY MANAGEMENT AT THE FACILITY LEVELEssential elements of nuclear security;
Basic principles of security management, budgeting and human resource planning, security culture, security awareness and integration with other disciplines;
Set‑up of a functional security organization, including governance instruments for establishing roles and responsibilities within the nuclear security management activities.
To describe the basic principles and processes of successfully managing security at nuclear and radiological facilities;
To demonstrate a holistic approach towards nuclear security;
To demonstrate knowledge of main international and national guidance and regulations;
To demonstrate knowledge of the responsibilities of a security manager;
To acquire skills for effective and sustainable management of nuclear security measures at a facility, including human resources, physical protection equipment, nuclear material accounting and control, and coordination;
To develop and implement contingency plans.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC5. SECURITY OF SENSITIVE NUCLEAR INFORMATION To clearly describe the role of information security in nuclear security;
To explain and give examples of information security controls relevant to nuclear and other radioactive material facilities and activities.
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| Elective Modules |
|
NSC6. NUCLEAR SECURITY CULTURETo describe the concept of nuclear security culture as a subset of organizational culture;
To describe the model of nuclear security culture as promoted by the IAEA, its components and attributes;
To identify the individual and organizational indicators that affect culture.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC7. THREAT ASSESSMENTTo analyse motivations and capabilities of adversaries and to have basic information about protection against terrorism;
To describe the methodology and the steps in performing State nuclear threat assessments, and in developing, implementing and maintaining design basis threats;
To describe the relationship between the design basis threat, risk analysis and protecting against terrorism.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC8. PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS DESIGN AND EVALUATIONTo present and discuss the fundamental principles of a physical protection system;
To plan and implement the process of physical protection system design;
To design and evaluate physical protection systems for different types of nuclear installation and facility.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC9. PHYSICAL PROTECTION TECHNOLOGIES AND EQUIPMENTTo acquire an in‑depth understanding of current technical methods, sensors and instruments in physical protection;
To learn how to select the appropriate equipment to satisfy the requirements for different physical protections systems.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC10. USE OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL (NMAC) FOR NUCLEAR SECURITYTo define and describe a State system of accounting for and control of nuclear and other radioactive material;
To become familiar with international safeguards;
To arrange national nuclear accounting and control systems at bulk and item facilities, perform national inspections, and analyse and report results of physical inventory taking as a part of broader State nuclear security measures.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC11. PREVENTING AND PROTECTING AGAINST INSIDER THREAT |
| Elective Modules |
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NSC12. SECURITY OF NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL IN TRANSPORTTo outline international transport security requirements;
To use practical guidelines for developing security measures for transport of nuclear and other radioactive material;
To select and implement transport security measures and technologies.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC13. COMPUTER SECURITY FOR A NUCLEAR WORLD |
| Elective Modules |
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NSC14. DETECTION OF CRIMINAL OR OTHER UNAUTHORIZED ACTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROLTo explain and apply the principles of detection of criminal or other unauthorized acts involving nuclear and other radioactive material, which is an important element of a comprehensive nuclear security system;
To outline the main detection systems and make recommendations for prevention and detection strategies at borders, strategic points and other locations of importance;
To comprehend the design features, the procedures for performance monitoring and the sustainability of detection systems.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSC15. RESPONSE TO CRIMINAL OR OTHER UNAUTHORIZED ACTS INVOLVING NUCLEAR AND OTHER RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL OUT OF REGULATORY CONTROL |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE1. INTERFACES OF NUCLEAR SECURITY WITH SAFETY AND SAFEGUARDS To identify and describe the concepts, objectives and principles of nuclear security as they interact with nuclear safety and safeguards;
To describe the interfaces between nuclear security with nuclear safety and safeguards, and the challenges and opportunities that they present.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSE2. LEGAL DRAFTING FOR NUCLEAR SECURITYTo be able to develop and draft legal acts and other documentation relating to nuclear security;
To integrate them into the existing national legal structure and process;
To ensure that they reflect the State’s obligations under the existing international legal instruments relating to nuclear security.
To identify basic concepts and substantive elements of a State’s comprehensive nuclear law, and in particular its components related to nuclear security;
To draft laws and regulations that fit within the overall national legal structure and process, and integrate State’s obligations under the relevant international legal instruments.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSE3. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION ON NUCLEAR SECURITYTo demonstrate knowledge of the principal stakeholders involved in the international cooperation on nuclear security;
To describe their goals, objectives, challenges and accomplishments.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSE4. DEVELOPING AND IMPLEMENTING DESIGN BASIS THREAT (DBT)To identify the goals, objectives and principal elements of the DBT;
To develop the DBT using the necessary information.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSE5. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT OF PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS |
| Elective Modules |
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A. Short description |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE7. DESIGNING PHYSICAL PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL FACILITIESTo apply specifics of physical protection measures and national regulations for security of nuclear and other radioactive material and associated facilities;
To design and evaluate a PPS for such facilities.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSE8. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL FOR NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS AND RESEARCH REACTORS |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE9. NUCLEAR MATERIAL ACCOUNTING AND CONTROL FOR FACILITIES THAT PROCESS NUCLEAR MATERIAL |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE10. ESTABLISHING AND IMPLEMENTING A TRANSPORT SECURITY PLANTo understand the purpose of a transport security plan;
To describe the elements of a transport security plan;
To develop an effective transport security plan.
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| Elective Modules |
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NSE11. DESIGNING AND IMPLEMENTING A NATIONAL DETECTION ARCHITECTURE (NDA) |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE12. IMPORT/EXPORT AND TRANSIT CONTROL MECHANISM AND REGIME |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE13. NUCLEAR SECURITY FRAMEWORK FOR MAJOR PUBLIC EVENTS |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE14. RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE15. NUCLEAR FORENSICS ANALYSIS |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE16. INFORMATION AND COMPUTER SECURITY INCIDENT RESPONSE |
| Elective Modules |
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NSE17. CONDUCTING COMPUTER SECURITY ASSESSMENTS |
| Elective Modules |
II–1. |
The proposed certificate programme in nuclear security differs from the master’s degree programme curriculum mainly in terms of the volume of information delivered throughout the programme, the learning objectives and the number of courses or modules offered. In general, whereas the master students are expected to be able to show in‑depth understanding and command of a broad range of topics in the area of nuclear security, holders of a certificate may only have to become aware of the importance, depth and breadth of this field, to familiarize themselves with these topics in order to afford it due priority while performing their main functions, and to bring to their organizations good nuclear security culture. |
| Elective Modules |
II–2. |
It is important, however, to ensure that certificate programme participants are introduced to each aspect of nuclear security, at least briefly, to facilitate this broad awareness. For that purpose, the outlines of the teaching modules introduced in Annex I can be used by the instructor, who can scale the scope of each presented module to the timeframe allocated to it, combine modules where necessary, and design modules with the ultimate learning objective of the certificate programme in mind. Depending on the priority, programmatic needs and regulations of educational institutions, certificate programmes may range in length from 1–2 to 14–16 weeks. Therefore, each institution deciding to establish such a certificate programme in the field of nuclear security may use this model curriculum to design the programme that fits their exact need. |
| Elective Modules |
II–3. |
Given the factors outlined above, a notional certificate programme in nuclear security may be based on the following outline: |